



MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

- 29 Dec 82

Enclosed is a draft letter back to G. Philip Hughes on the A Team-B Team issue. Also, I've attached  note to me.



25X1

25X1

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

Here is my best shot at what we might say to The VP's assistant.

If we know more about what interest The VP's office has in the correspondence we might be more helpful.

I believe Mr. Buck would agree with the suggested key points in the draft -- at least he probably agreed with them.

Date

25X1

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

D R A F T
29 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. Philip Hughes
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Letter from Martin Hoade

1. In response to your memorandum of 17 December 1982, I am forwarding a copy of an unclassified report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the A Team-B Team experiment. The SSCI report is the only detailed, official statement about the experiment and contains an accurate treatment of the facts and circumstances.

2. As a result of press leaks and speculations by journalists, accounts of the A Team-B Team experiment in the media have contained a great deal of misinformation. The most recent account in Robert Scheer's article "With Enough Shovels" in the December 1982 issue of Playboy, is patently wrong and appears contrived, like several articles addressing the experiment, to support the author's broader thesis. Even John Prados who has objectively researched the national estimative history in his recent book, "The Soviet Estimate," incorrectly describes the experiment and its results--probably because of insufficient unclassified sources on the subject.

3. As distinct from factual accounts of the A Team-B Team experiment, its effects on the intelligence estimative process and on official and public perceptions of the Soviet threat are subject to differing interpretations and points of view by people in and out of government. Here again, there have been no detailed, official pronouncements on this point except for the views of the SSCI in the attached report. It should be noted that we did not agree

with several of the views of the SSCI, especially the separate views of Senators Moynihan and Wallop.

4. We regret the dearth of general, unclassified material on the A Team-B Team experiment that you might use in responding to Mr. Hoades letter. However, we believe Mr. Hoade could be informed of the following key points:

- The DCI directed the A Team-B Team experiment be undertaken for the sole purpose of testing a proposal of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that the technique of competitive analysis be incorporated in the national estimating process.
- The experiment proceeded as planned, it was professionally carried out by all parties involved, and it accomplished its purpose.
- Contrary to allegations in the media, the judgments in the 1976 NIEs were not shaped by the conclusions of the B Team.
- The experiment and press leaks about it did not undermine the integrity of the National Estimates or the Intelligence Community.

Attachment

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

TO:


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19	C/IPD/OIS				
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

 Executive Secretary
12/24/80
 Date

407 (10-61)

25X1



10372/82
Rec'd 21 Dec.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


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SUBJECT: Letter from Martin Hoade

Attached, per our conversation of this morning, is the letter to the Vice President from Martin Hoade that I mentioned to you. I would be most appreciative if you would see what the Agency can put together by way of general, unclassified background on the Team A/Team B exercise.

Thanks for your help.

G. Philip Hughes
Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs



The Honourable George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C.

MISTER VICE PRESIDENT -

In the publication, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counter-Intelligence", is the statement that when you were Director of the Central Intelligence Agency you established the Team A and Team B mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of intelligence estimates and analyses, all this in 1976.

Can your staff explain to me, more fully, the work of this concept ?

If they will advise me of the cost of any pertinent publication, can they, please, advise me so I may reimburse them ?

Thank you for considering this request amid your daily burden of work and duties.

I am, with respect,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Hoade", written over a horizontal line.

9 December 1982

The reason: I am researching a possibility for a television documentary on the need to strengthen our nation's intelligence resources.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

NSC Staff Request for Evaluations of the A Team-B Team Experiment

FROM:

Lawrence K. Gershwin
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

EXTENSION

DATE

16 November 1982

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1

VChm/NIC

16 Nov

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For signature

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DDI

16 Nov

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19 NOV 1982

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ACTION